Author(s)

Wang Fei

Corresponding Author

Wang Fei

Abstract

In the Internet crowdsourcing market, due to the asymmetric information between project sponsors and consumers, consumers face greater risks in the process of choosing investment projects. As an intermediary platform, the penalty effect under the sponsor's supervision mechanism can effectively avoid such problems. In order to study the decision-making mechanism of incentive crowdsourcing platform's operation mode selection behavior, the evolutionary game model of incentive crowdsourcing platform and project sponsor's strategic behavior under incentive crowdsourcing mode is constructed by using evolutionary game theory. The evolution dynamic stability analysis of each stakeholder strategy was carried out, and the key factors affecting the choice of the operation mode of the reward crowdfunding platform were explored through numerical simulation. There is a serious information asymmetry between the fundraiser and the crowdfunding platform, which will not only indirectly damage the interests of investors, but also affect the reputation of the platform. It is also not conducive to the sound development of the crowdfunding industry. To improve the above problems, it is necessary to strengthen the screening, review and supervision functions of the crowdfunding platform for product projects initiated by fundraisers.

Keywords

Crowdsourcing platform, incentive supervision, sponsor