Author(s)

Li Baoxian

Corresponding Author

Li Baoxian

Abstract

In modern enterprises, the existence of the agency relationship is very common, but because of the separation of the two rights, the interests of the principal and the agent are different, they pursue the maximization of their own interests, and there is also the phenomenon of information asymmetry. The self-interest behavior of the agents may lead to the sacrifice of the interests of the principal in order to satisfy their own interests, and increase the proxy growth. For high-tech enterprises, the owners and operators of listed companies form a typical entrusted agency relationship. With the continuous development of economic globalization, the competition between companies is increasingly fierce. So, how to effectively motivate executives and. Restricting the self-interest behavior of executives has become an important issue in modern enterprise theory research, and the incentive mechanism of executive compensation has been widely concerned by many scholars at home and abroad. How does executive compensation affect the effectiveness of corporate performance? In recent years, the research on the correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation has become the theoretical basis for the establishment of a scientific and reasonable executive compensation system, and has attracted more and more scholars' attention.

Keywords

Executive compensation, Enterprise performance, correlation Research