Zhang Zuliang: Commander of Inventing the Policy of "Military Strike, Political Struggle, and Mobilization of the Masses"

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Abstract: In the suppression of bandits in western Sichuan from 1950 to 1952, General Zhang Zuliang, commander of the military region and director of the National Committee, advocated and practiced the 12-character combat policy of "military strike, political struggle, and mobilization of the masses," and won the battle against bandits. Based on the data provided by patriotic comrades of intelligence staff of western Sichuan military region during the march into Heishui, this paper was intended to make more scholars understand to provide a basis for further academic research.

1. Introduction

From 1950 to 1952, commander Zhang Zuliang commanded bandit suppression operations in the Western Sichuan military region. The 12-character combat policy of "military strike, political struggle, and mobilization of the masses" was pioneered by him. The 12-character policy is the policy of combining military and government with both military and government, which is consistent with the policy of "giving priority to military attack and giving priority to political struggle" put forward by the Central Military Commission and the Southwest Bureau. His great contribution in the practice of bandit suppression and his strategy of suppressing bandits were affirmed by Chairman Mao, and the whole army was ordered to study and implement them.

2. The Initial Period of Rebellion in the Whole Region

"On February 5th, 1950, the lunar calendar was the 19th of the 12th lunar month, and in 11 days it would be the first Spring Festival after the liberation of Chengdu. Chengdu was peacefully liberated into a grand city style. It had just passed the 35th day from the Longtan Temple with 20 Huali in the outer east. Our 178th Division and head of the political department of Mianyang military division, Zhu Xiangli, was brutally killed by bandits when he returned to Chengdu on his way to Shibantan, home of Zhu Dingqing's headquarters, the third regiment of which he is the chief military representative. Armed rebel bandits occupied 6 of the 22 farms outside Chengdu, and the rest were volatile. Large swathes of the countryside were controlled by bandits, and many of our troops who went down the mountain to collect food and form district and township regimes were killed by raids. The 24 platoon battalion cadres who represented Zhu Dingqing were also killed in the line of duty. Armed rebel bandits occupied 6 of the 22 farms outside Chengdu, and the rest were volatile. Large swathes of the countryside were controlled by bandits, and many of our troops who went down the mountain to collect food and form district and township regimes were killed by raids. The 24 platoon battalion cadres who represented Zhu Dingqing were also killed in the line of duty. Armed rebel bandits, surrounded by Chengdu from the southeast, the bull market entrance less than a kilometer from the Dongmen Bridge has become an open area for armed bandits. Longtan Temple revolt a gunshot overnight, and 11 counties around Chengdu of armed rebellion occurred at the same time. Within a week, the bandits rose to 60,000. The bandits not only occupied the urban area, but also blocked 7 of the 8 highways extending outward in Chengdu, killing more than 1000 people who had been working in the village to collect grain and build up the army.

The Western Sichuan military region is composed of 18 corps command organs and programs, and Zhang Zuliang, assumed the office of commander of the Western Sichuan military region and commander of Chengdu Police Guard. In order to quickly extinguish the arrogance of the bandits' total rebellion, the regiment carried out suppression in the two seriously affected areas on the east
and west sides of Chengdu. Although the two sides of the battle to suppress more than 400 bandits, but the elimination of more than 20,000 rebels is far from. The reason is that the bandits are local, and the bandits are indistinguishable, but we are here. Moreover, the vice-verse. When the rebels used scattered impermanence to deal with me, they changed their feet in time and received immediate results. This was the first contribution made by Commander Zhang Zuliang in the first stage of the suppression of bandits in western Sichuan.

3. The Period of Clearing and Suppression in Pingchuan

As a result of persisting in the divisional zone-wide campaign, we prevented the troops from "fighting for the north and south," and moved too frequently and "closed up" one area and one point to the other. By the end of June, the armed forces had basically wiped out more than 100 people in Pingchuan. In addition to Qionglai Tiantai Mountain, Tonggang Mountain, Yangergang Mountain and the Hongkou area near Wenchuan to the west of Guanxian, Sanjiangkou, the border area of Wenchuan, and the Whirlangkou area, there are still 500-1,000 people in the Waikou area, with the exception of those who have yet to be exterminated. It is also a small band of bandits of 10-30 people, mostly in the border areas of counties and provinces. The area in which our troops are distributed according to the bandits. And the number of regroupments, and the deployment of different numbers of troops to the areas where the units and bandits were assembled to suppress bandits, so that to carry out repeated campaigns. By the end of September, the three districts in the mainland nearly 34 counties of more than 10 people, has been basically resolved. At this point, the first stage of the suppression of bandits, that is, the number of large-scale suppression of bandits at the end of the stage. A total of 150,000 bandits were wiped out throughout the region. Most of the bandits have been wiped out, and the areas formerly controlled by the bandits have been listed as "purified" areas. After the annihilation of the bandits, the enemy's means of struggle against us have also undergone new changes. From then on, we entered the second stage of the struggle against bandits. The main manifestations of banditry at this stage are:

First, when the bandits carried out a campaign in front of our army, a unit was disbanded on its own, with the exception of those who had been held hostage, the undead were transferred to the "underground". Second, in the presence of our army, more people surrender or register than we do on the battlefield. And these "rehabilitate personnel", still have a large number of false self-renewal. Third, there are some big figures who did not participate openly during the rebellion. For example, the pseudo legislators, the commander in chief of the "Chinese people's Cooperative Army", and so on, all lived in the guesthouse of the United Front work Department of our district party committee. Enjoy the kindness of an insurrection general or an enlightened person in the event of an affair, they secretly manipulate and command the armed rebellion of the bandit, such as Huang, Li Ze, and Liu Jingui (all in the 2500-3000) bandits.

By the beginning of 1951, the southwest military and political commission formally promulgated the southwest to carry out "suppression, anti-hegemony, rent reduction, rentals" four missions. In short, putting the "anti-hegemony" struggle on the agenda of the work of the whole region has become a major strategic task, as evidenced by Chairman Mao's instruction, and it was the Western Sichuan military region that first proposed the "anti-hegemony" struggle. It is Comrade Zhang Zuliang, commander of the Western Sichuan military region, who can clearly put forward this strategic task. This is the second contribution made by Commander Zhang Zuliang in the struggle against bandits in western Sichuan.

4. Suppression of Bandits in Mountainous Areas Inhabited by Ethnic Minorities

Maoxian, namely is the Aba Tibetan Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. Maoxian District govern 6 counties including Maoxian County, Wenchuan, Lixian, Songpan, Maogong (now Xiao Jin), Jinghua (now Jinchuan, also known as Da Jin), Maoxian sub-district, formed by the 179 Division, combat units into only one regiment. At first, it occupied only the "Ya-shaped" valley area of the Minjiang River valley, including Wenchuan, Maoxian, Songpan, Li County, and the two banks
along the river. The customs and customs of the people were roughly similar to those of the Han region, where the Qiang nationality mainly lived in mixed ethnic areas. And the vast areas inhabited by a single ethnic group and the two counties that are still snowbound are yet to be liberated. The total area of Xueshan grassland 6 counties under the jurisdiction of Maoxian Subarea is larger than that of Zhejiang Province, and only one regiment can not be qualified for the task of liberating the whole territory.

After determining the plan of fighting against bandits in Jingmao, Commander Zhang personally inspected the division of the 179th division of Guanxian, inspected the troops, and saw off Wu Shihong and other comrades who entered the mountains. According to the deployment arrangements of Commander Zhang, Wu Shihong, the 179th division commander, led two battalions and another company as the eastern line. Starting from Guanxian, through the Whirlangkou, Niutou Mountain and Balang Mountains, two snow mountains entered the territory of Maogong and quickly occupied the Rilong pass. Under Maogong City, there was no battle all the way. On the northern line, Yao Xiochong, deputy commander and chief of staff of Maoxian sub-district, led five companies. Starting from Zagu Nao, the Hongqiao Daxue Mountain entered the mouth of Maogong Liangkou. After Wei Yusheng's gang resisted Weijiashan and wiped out one of the brigands, director Yao continued to lead a company, along the edge of Henan, occupation of Mupo, Fu Bian, outside Maogong City, with the eastern line troops. Deputy Commander Men continued to lead the other four companies, overturning the city of Shanxi, along the way many times with the bandits exchanged fire, while fighting towards Jinghua County. On the west side, Xixue Zhou, military affairs chief of Kangding military Sub-district of Xikang Province, led the 558 regiment to advance from Danba to Maogong from southwest. September 19, east, north, west third line troops, went into Maogong at the same time. Zhou Xun, Fu Bingxun, Fuhe Benchu and other Han bandits all fled into the forest or into the minority mountain areas to hide, or fled to the Chuoshijia Tusi tribe of Xikang Province at that time. After the liberation of Mao, we immediately launched a large-scale political offensive. First, we called for the leader of the bandits to come down. The other was to summon a Tun Tusi to attend a meeting in the county town, participated in political proceedings, and discussed plans for the construction of bandit suppression. Both efforts have yielded the expected results. However, in January 1951, Jingmao two lines of large-scale armed rebellion, so two counties of Maogong, Jinghua lost.

Jing, Mao's second armed rebellion, was caused by two reasons. For one thing, there were more than 2000 Han bandits in the foreign areas, and the first foray was almost without a major blow. 60 troops left the northwest of Sichuan and there were rumors all over the mountains that Chengdu was empty and that Chongqing had been occupied by American airborne troops. The bandits in the mountainous areas were moved to cooperate with the United States and Chiang Kai-shek to "return to attack." Second, is our internal reason, including the counties work were lost in impatience. Such as smoking, propaganda, tax card collection and other work have rushed into, which give opportunity for the bandit disinformation. After the 60t troop left Sichuan, the telegram signed by Zhang Zuxin and Li Jingquan repeatedly instructed the Jingmao working Committee to "pay attention to the principle of stability and to strictly guard against rash advance", pointing out in particular: "it is not appropriate to ban smoking and levy taxes, and grain is not levied at the moment; the construction of strong fortifications will lead to the severe winter after the first heavy snowfall."

After the loss of the two counties, the military region sent Wen Xianxing, deputy chief of staff of the military region, and Luo Zhimin, director of organization of the party committee of the western Sichuan region to reinforce him. Men Guoliang evacuated Danba troops, with another 558 regiment a battalion, also backed to Maogong. However, because of rampant banditry, they still could not reverse the form of Maogong. The military region reinforced three more battalions, reaching a total of 10 battalions, fighting for nearly four months. When commanding the suppression of bandits in Jingjing and Maomao counties, Commander Zhang Zuliang clearly pointed out that the policy of combining "military strike, political struggle and mobilization of the masses" must be applied to suppress bandits in minority areas. In 1952, during the battle of suppressing bandits in Heishui,
Comrade Guo Linxiang, deputy political commissar of the Southwest Public Security Force led Heishui in the Western Sichuan military region to the front-line command post. After arriving at Matang, he gave the orders to the front line, explicitly put forward the policy of combining "military strike, political struggle, and mobilization of the masses."

5. Summary

The essence of the "12-character policy" of Commander Zhang Zuliang is the theory from Deng Xiaoping about "being unable to use troops in minority areas without political struggle for military strikes;" The political struggle without military support is also the flexible application of the "principle of combat in the campaign against bandits in Heishui." They continued to play a role in the subsequent campaigns against bandits in the grasslands (Tibetan areas), in Liangshan (Yi people), and later in the Aba Tibetan areas, in the Kangba Tibetan areas and in the Qamdo areas of Tibet. That is to say, it is still worth studying and excavating its historical value and summing up its experience and lessons.

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References

