Research on the Military and Government: Preparing for the Liberation of Heishui County

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Abstract: The Heishui campaign, which took place in the Tibetan and Qiang areas of northwest Sichuan in 1952, was hailed by Chairman Mao Zedong as a double victory between military and government. Today, on the 66th anniversary of the liberation of Heishui, according to the information provided by patriotic comrades of the intelligence staff of the Western Sichuan military region during the march into Heishui, the author collated this oral interview in order to let more people understand and study this little-known history. At the same time, the preservation of precious oral historical data provides a basis for further academic research.

1. How Did the So-called "Land Taiwan" Come into Being?

It is no accident that the so-called "land Taiwan" was formed. In early 1950, the second battalion of the 535 regiment of the Chinese people's Liberation Army advanced westward from Weizhou, continuing to pursue and wipe out the Kuomintang's diehard forces in various battlefields and march into Tibet. By 1952, in order to save its defeat on the Korean battlefield and the "tardiness" of our army's advance toward Tibet, the US imperialists helped Jiang Jieshi formulate a "counter-attack on the mainland" with the so-called "three knives and one bomb." The United States sent aircraft directly to the special agents airdropped the Heishui to create the so-called land Taiwan counter-offensive against the Communist foundation. As a bomb in the hinterland of our mainland, it bloomed and radiated around it, thus causing a large-scale armed rebellion in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Kang, Gansu and Qinghai provinces. After the Spring Festival in 1951, the second armed rebellion was launched by bandits in two counties, Mao, Jing (Jinxiaojing, Jinchuan). The fierce bandits who had lost their nets after the counter-insurgency fled to the "four lands" region centered on Markane one after another. At this time, the son of Su Yonghe's son, Su Xisheng, according to his father's orders, accompanied the rebel Fu Bingxun to the Heishui. Su Yonghe handed over the Fu bandits to Gao Yangping, who was in charge of Musu, and Fu lived in Musuxue Ba Temple.

In Heishui, there was a radio station sent by Hu Zongnan's Special Agent Liu Zongyu. After Fu Bingxun came to Heishui, he stole the telegram given by Zhou Xun in addition to the stolen radio station of the original Jinghua county post office. With the above three unserviceable radio stations and the collaboration of Yuan Zhenghong, Wang Fayao, Ma Weiyan and Yu Chueyun, he restored the radio station given by former Zhou Xun, and was able to communicate with the Taiwan Security Bureau's headquarters radio station.

Fu Bingxun, who fled to Heishui, made contact with Taiwan, then made a big publicity campaign and recruited people, and Han bandits from all over the world gathered to Heishui. In this way, Heishui became the land Taiwan in the eyes of Chiang Kai-shek, and became the center of bandit in the four provinces of Kang, Gan, Qing and Sichuan.

2. Military and Government Worked Together to Make Adequate Preparations for the Liberation of Heishui

The Heishui region is located in the Heishui River basin, a tributary of the Minjiang River,
centered on the flowers of the Reed, is the dependency of Shoumou Tusi, and is a concentrated area dominated by Jialong Tibetans. In history, Emperor Qianlong did military action in Heishui area for more than ten years. The Sichuan army's three campaigns, either victorious or disastrous, left the local people with "fear of Han", "enemy" and other cognition and emotion. Emperor Qianlong's more than ten years of military operations in the Heishui area and the three encirclement and suppression campaigns by the Sichuan army left the local people with cognition and feelings of "fear of Han" and "hatred of the Han". The rulers of successive dynasties implemented a policy of "isolation", discriminatory measures and economic oppression on this ethnic region, coupled with the anti-Communist propaganda and reactionary national policies of the Kuomintang government, the region was a "granary" in northwest Sichuan. But the local people were poor and vaguely aware of the outside world, especially against the Han people and the Han army.

Similarly, the Heishui region is an old revolutionary area. During the long March, the Red Army held a famous meeting in Heishui County. The Red Army stationed and passed 90,000 people for about 150 days. The Red Army raised about 7.1 million catties of grain, raised a large number of cattle hair and other cold materials, and provided a solid material guarantee for the Red Army to cross the snowy mountains and grasslands. At the same time, the establishment of regional and township Soviet government and "guerrillas" spread the revolutionary fire deeply on the land of Heishui.

As for the tiny country of Heishui, the reason why it can attract great attention from both sides of the enemy and our country is that the focus is on the strategic level to deal with this problem. The enemy thinks the Heishui can build a time bomb which stuck in our heart. As soon as it explodes, it can release four ripple radiation circles, first around Heishui, then surrounding Tibetan counties, then Sichuan, Kanggan and Qing provinces, and finally, the rebellion and instability in the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities in Tibet, Yunnan, and Xinjiang. In this way, the US imperialist's fantasy of "forcing the Chinese Communists to no longer be able to send more troops to the DPRK" and "delaying the speed of the Chinese troops pushing back to Tibet" can be achieved.

Our Party attached importance to Heishui, which has only more than 3000 families and a population of only 20,000. It is precisely from the strategic height of crushing the US and Chiang Kai-shek bandits that we managed the Heishui, which was the counter-communist strategic base. Chairman Mao pointed out: "Heishui is a small Taiwan, Greater Taiwan is a small Taiwan". In order to liberate the Heishui, we have made sufficient planning and operational preparation from the ideological unity of understanding to the deployment of military and government.

Our understanding for Heishui can be divided into two stages: First of all, Heishui is a special area worth paying attention to. Although it was not initially regarded as a key place to solve many complex problems in the Northwest Plateau of Sichuan Province, it did regard solving the Heishui problem as a first problem to be grasped, understood, and put emphasis on step by step. At the beginning of liberation, the leading organs of Party, government and army in our Maoxian District put the issue of Heishui on the agenda. The reason was that Su Yonghe, head of Heishui, had become the first of the three arms in the Tibetan region of the Northwest Sichuan Snow Plateau. In less than 20 years, he had managed to control the ruling power of the original Shoumou tribe by killing and fighting the small people of only 107 families in Ershui and the two ditches, not only defeating the other five major people in Heishui, but also controlling the ruling power of the original Shoumou tribe.

When Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, talks about work in minority areas, he first strive to do a good job of leading figures. Su Yonghe, a powerful figure in Heishui, was known as the Snow Mountain King. In order to win the return of Su Yonghe, we have sent many working groups, solace groups, and delegations to work. Ren Jinglong, head of the United Front work Department of the district party committee, and Luo Zhimin, director of the organization department, all went to Heishui politics to fight for Su Yonghe. Not only did he serve as a member of the "Situ", Aba, and Zhuosijia interim military and Administrative Committees, but also the Party Committee and the military region sent Tianbao to Heishui to do his work. Su Yonghe has always adopted a two-sided attitude toward the Communist Party and the
Kuomintang. On the one hand, he agreed to the leadership of the Communist Party, and agreed to the entry of the working Group. At the same time, he received Fu Bingxun, who fled to Heishui after the Jingmao riots, and other bandits who were disabled.

At the same time, we also fully realize that to truly solve the Heishui problem, only relying on "political struggle" is very difficult to work. Political commissar Deng said: "We do not have a military attack that we do not have to fight for politically, and a political struggle without the backing of military forces is also feeble and ineffective." Especially to Su Yonghe, a great heroic figure who started on horseback by killing a man, if the military power cannot be achieved, it will not be possible if the other side voluntarily relinquishes the privileges of power that the other party has acquired.

Under the influence of the situation, or "power contest," which determines everything, we clearly must work on both the military and political fronts. The exchange of personnel was indispensable, but the promotion of military strength, especially in the first place, was the necessary means to gain and restrict the other side.

In order to know the enemy, we must make every effort to understand the target. For this reason, the leading party, government, and military organs at the district level, such as the investigation Section of the military Subarea, the United Front work Department of the prefectural Committee, and the Public Security Office of the Special Administration, all put "understanding" on Heishui on an extremely important position.

Zhang Zuliang, commander of the military region and secretary of the regional party committee and people's work committee, directly controls the progress of work in all ethnic minority areas, including the Heishui. In early 1951, the Western Sichuan military region established three intelligence stations, Marcon, Guanxian and Songpan, all of which focused on Heishui, especially Songpan. As a result of the hard work of the above units and comrades, before the Heishui campaign, the Western Sichuan military Command printed three maps showing the conditions of the Heishui mountains, rivers, and roads. The political commissar Deng Xiaoping of the Southwest Bureau and Commander He Long of the Southwest military region concretely directed every operation to suppress the bandits against Heishui.

3. Summary

Before the Heishui campaign, commander-in-Chief Zhu personally visited the Southwest military region to inspect combat readiness operations. Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the Southwest Bureau, went to Chengdu to inspect war readiness. Commander He Long went to Guanxian County to visit the army. For all this, the "Heishui", a tiny place, can not bear. The reason is that Heishui's bandit suppression was in fact a war against Taiwan's Chiang Gang and the American imperialist's anti-China strategy.

Today, it is only a few hours' drive from Chengdu to Heishui, But in 1952, nearly 400 kilometers of hiking took place from Chengdu to Heishui, and it really took 15-16 days to get there. In order to solve the problem of food for the 21000 troops participating in the war, before the launching of the campaign, 40, 000 peasant workers from the plain area were mobilized to fight in the front to take up the work of transporting grain. As Field Marshal He Long said: the army has not moved, food and grass first. All this was the preparatory work done before the start of the Heishui campaign for the victory of the Heishui campaign, which laid the foundation for the victory of the Heishui campaign in a two-pronged manner. It provides valuable basic experience and practical enlightenment for the later "grassland campaign" and the settlement of the ethnic problems in Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai borders.

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References


