Author(s)

Ning Chen

Corresponding Author

Ning Chen

Abstract

The international trade dispute settlement mechanism mainly includes bilateral negotiation, plurilateral integration, and multilateral WTO dissolving mechanism. The relevant domestic and foreign literature seldom involve the choices and advantages and disadvantages of these three mechanisms. This paper uses a theoretical framework of the game to analyze the welfare of a single country under different settlement mechanisms and the total welfare status of the world from the perspective of the difference between the state and the type of trade product market. As a result, it has been found that for large countries with market power, the fewer the participating countries are, the better the mechanism is for them, and for smaller countries that do not have market power, the more participating countries are, the more beneficial the mechanism is, and the mechanism for multinational participation is also more effectively beneficial for the world's total welfare. Therefore, when choosing a trade dispute resolution mechanism, China must make a reasonable choice based on the market competition of the disputed commodities and the price influence and control ability; from the perspective of the market characteristics of most of China's export commodities, and the mechanisms for more countries to participate may be more favorable.

Keywords

The Belt and Road, Trade dispute resolution strategy, International trade, Control charts, Process capability.